

## **SENATORS BERGESON AND HART LEAD THE WAY TO REFORM IN THE 1980s**

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### *Editor's Introduction:*

*This section chronicles the major events and issues leading to the enactment of the Bergeson and Hart reforms in 1988. Brodt seeks to outline the major notions, events and forces acting on teacher credentialing reform. The complexity of the reform ideas and the stands of various organizations leave little subtlety. However, putting the ideas together and gaining enough consensus among stakeholders to pass a major reform bill was remarkably difficult.*

### **The Legislature Takes the Initiative**

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, while the Commission was attempting to formulate its role and to gain consensus on policy goals, the Legislature was eager for action. Taking the initiative, the legislature passed two major pieces of legislation; one requiring the administrators to undergo training and the other requiring educators to pass a basic skills test. The Commission's first two attempts at legislated reform, in 1982 and 1983, either met defeat at the hands of the CTA or were partially incorporated into the Hughes-Hart Reform Act, SB 813 of 1983. The release of the Commons Commission recommendations shifted the dynamics by expanding the pool of those interested in major structural change and set the stage for comprehensive reform in educator preparation, induction and continuing professional development.

### **The Two-Tiered Administrative Credential**

When the Ryan Act was enacted, the standard for an Administrative Credential became an examination. In time, this standard came to be perceived as inadequate by policymakers and administrators alike, and in 1977, Senator Rodda guided a bill through the Legislature to require administrators to receive additional training. That bill was vetoed by Governor Jerry

Brown who reasoned that local school boards should have wide latitude in selecting administrators and the requirement to undergo a training program would restrict the potential pool of talent.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, research began to show that there was a strong relationship between principal competency and school quality. Legislative interest persisted, and during 1978 and 1979, Assemblyman Dennis Mangers took up the issue. His efforts led to a report concluding that certification requirements for principals were inadequate, especially in vital areas of program development, leadership and teacher evaluation. Mangers sponsored a bill that formally asked the Commission: “Should there be a separate credential for the school principal?”

The Commission formed an “Ad Hoc Committee on School Site Administrators” and a study was conducted involving 192 school principals. This group suggested that not just principals, but all administrators, should undergo training, and the process should be in two steps. It was felt that the greatest weakness of the one-step credential was its emphasis on “pre-service” preparation covering broad aspects of administration regardless of an individual candidate’s readiness or need. Many topics were either covered too shallowly or theoretically to meet the needs of beginning administrators, especially those at the site level. Moreover, since a field work component was not required, some programs were merely didactic. A two-tier credential would allow a developmental process combining theory and practice based upon readiness and experience. Upon completion of the initial program, candidates would be issued a Preliminary Credential. Subsequently, when the individual became a full-time administrator, he or she would be required to undertake an individualized advanced program that would concentrate on the more theoretical and broader aspects of administration. Both levels would require in-depth field experience.<sup>2</sup> The Ad Hoc Committee recommended legislation to enact a two-tiered credential.

Assemblymember Marian Bergeson initially carried the initial bill written by Commission Consultant Sidney Inglis, but in 1981, the Bergeson measure was incorporated into another

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<sup>1</sup> CPTL Minutes, September 1-2, 1977

<sup>2</sup> Sidney Arthur Inglis, Jr., “The Two-Tier Administrative Credential: What is it and How it Developed,” Thrust (November/December, 1988)

bill carried by Assemblyman Leroy Greene, which was enacted. Thus, the first two-step credential in the nation was created, which in turn laid the foundation for the two-step teaching credential. Perhaps more importantly, it was a credential that incorporated research on the way educators learn.<sup>3</sup>

### **Rousing of the Commission**

The Commission felt the legislature's interest in credentialing policy and by, in turn, pressuring its Executive Secretary for action. Beginning in January 1979, Executive Secretary Peter LoPresti initiated an informal discussion format that allowed the Commission to address issues in depth. In what would be described as an ambitious strategic plan today, he presented a vision and proposed ten major goals. These were to: (1) develop an individual teacher assessment system, (2) determine the relationship between subject matter preparation and teacher effectiveness, (3) revise the program approval process, (4) assess the Life Credential's usefulness, (5) redefine the agency's role in enforcing professional standards, (6) determine the Commission's role in disseminating the Beginning Teacher Evaluation Study, (7) re-evaluate the examination system, (8) analyze and update the Ryan Act, (9) define the agency's leadership role, and (10) attain financial stability for the agency. Interestingly, many of the issues had been suggested in a report by the Legislative Analyst's Office and, in varying degrees, these issues came to dominate the Commission's activities for the next ten years.<sup>4</sup>

In a flurry of activity following LoPresti's initiative, staff positions were created and major organizational changes were made within the agency. Program review procedures were redesigned; a major bilingual education study was launched; a committee was formed to address the skills teachers needed to handle classroom confrontations; and a process was started to develop long range goals. A legislative committee was created to keep track of an increasing amount of legislation relating to credentialing. The Commission also started initiating its own legislation. In its first effort, the Commission proposed to add higher education representatives to the body, increase credential fees, and impose a "registry" to require that teachers periodically register and pay fees to the Commission. The first proposal

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<sup>3</sup> CTPL Minutes, November 6-7, 1980 and August, 1981; Inglis, 1988; Inglis, 1989

would have given higher education greater influence, and the last two would have provided new sources of revenue.

### **A Change in Executive Secretary**

Even with LoPresti's initiatives, many observers felt that under LoPresti's accommodating leadership, the Commission had become "captured" by the very entities it regulated—teacher training institutions. The Commission not only included knowledgeable and articulate members from higher education sector, but had a number of audience participants representing teacher education organizations or institutions. LoPresti, with his proclivity for cooperation with higher education, viewed this situation positively. However, the Commission membership was questioning LoPresti's ability to undertake legislative initiatives and were pressuring him to be more assertive.

At the same time, the Legislature was becoming increasingly restless and discussing major changes in credentialing and the Ryan Act. Legislators and their staffs were hearing complaints about the agency's operation from individuals and interest groups, and as a result, bills were being introduced. The Commission's agenda was absent from legislative consideration, and the broader policy considerations were being impacted by concerns expressed by classroom teachers, parents and others.<sup>5</sup>

By the beginning of 1980, little action had been taken on the broad initiatives LoPresti had listed at the beginning of 1979. When Robert Salley assumed the chairmanship in mid-1979, he and other Commissioners urged LoPresti to take bold actions and place the Commission in the forefront of innovation and leadership. Instead, LoPresti tendered his resignation in April of 1980 during Executive Session.<sup>6</sup> In August, John F. Brown was named Executive Secretary. In addition to being an Afro-American with high qualifications, Brown had been recommended by Assemblymember John Vasconcellos.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> CTPL Minutes, January 4-5, 1979

<sup>5</sup> CPTL Minutes, January 4-5, 1979

<sup>6</sup> CPTL Minutes, May 1-2, 1980

## **Financial Problems**

Because of diminishing enrollments in schools, the state was experiencing a surplus of teachers and fewer candidates were undertaking teacher training. With funding tied directly to the number of credentials it processed, the agency encountered severe fiscal constraints as the applications diminished. Taking advantage of their new found links with John Vasconcellos, Brown, Salley, and Vice Chair David Levering met with Assemblymembers Vasconcellos and Hart and their staffs. Both the finances and the role of the agency were discussed, and apparently, the legislators agreed to seek general funds for the agency. The idea progressed, however, the Department of Finance disagreed, and the Commission suffered through several years of financial anguish until credential applications increased again in the mid 1980s.<sup>8</sup>

## **Questioning from the Legislature**

The primary urge to establish more effective Commission leadership was in response to the negative view of the Commission developing in the Legislature. After changing Executive Secretaries and seeking general funds, Chair Robert Salley distributed a memo from Assemblymember Marian Bergeson who proposed a Task Force on Teacher Preparation and Licensing. Its purpose would be to review “the entire teacher credentialing area” with the goals of streamlining the law, reassessing the Commission’s duties, giving more discretion to colleges and universities, giving maximum flexibility to school districts, and finding ways to encourage teachers to undertake continuing education in the name of professionalism.

## **Genesis of Reform Ideas**

By the early 1980s, the Commission’s reform ideas had evolved over several years. One of the major thrusts was the five-year Beginning Teacher Evaluation Study (BTES), initiated in 1972. This study was initially prompted by the Commission’s desire to establish standards based on the recognizable qualities of a good teacher. However, as the study evolved, researchers realized that the study was too broad, and its focus shifted and concentrated on

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<sup>7</sup> CPTL Minutes, August 7-8, 1980

the ways that elementary children learn. After going through various phases, it eventually concentrated on classroom climate, teacher planning, instructional decision making, consistency and appropriateness of teaching behaviors, how instructional time is used, and student engagement in instructional time.<sup>9</sup>

Near the end of the study in 1977, the researchers stated that although the knowledge gained from the project would help California take a leadership role in teacher training programs, the results should not be used to shape policy. Nevertheless, they felt that beginning teachers should start with limited credential, and after gaining experience and additional training, be awarded a more comprehensive credential to undertake a wider range of teaching responsibilities. The researchers did not urge limiting teachers to grade levels or subject matter specialization and felt that two kinds of credential structures were needed—general and specialized. Rather than stressing one way to prepare teachers, they recommended that two or three teacher education models be developed.<sup>10</sup> Although the BTES results were not recommended for guiding policy, they provided the Commission with many of the seeds for its eventual reform package. Most prominent was a proposal for a two-step teaching credential and additional training paths to the classroom.

### **Ad Hoc Committee on the Fifth Year of Study**

In 1980, the Commission established an “ad hoc Committee on the Fifth year of Study” to assess the content of the fifth year teacher preparation. Significantly, this committee started addressing the way teachers learn their craft and adopted several “beliefs and positions.” The most sweeping proposal suggested that teacher training should not be thought of as a one-year period, but rather a continuum of preservice and in-service. It should extend over a three to five year period and include education courses, student teaching, and an extensive supervised internship. The two-tier credential was proposed. A preliminary internship credential would be issued upon completion of education course work and student teaching. After completing an internship, a permanent “professional” credential would be issued and would be subject to periodic renewal requirements. During the internship, both the preparing

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<sup>8</sup> CPTL Minutes, September 3-5 and November 6-7, 1980

<sup>9</sup> LoPresti, 1977

<sup>10</sup> CTPL Minutes March 2-3, 1978

university and the school district would be mutually responsible for providing a support system and for the candidate's success.<sup>11</sup> To implement such a system, several major obstacles would have to be overcome—especially issues involving roles and responsibilities. Combining preservice and in-service would require cooperation between the Commission and the State Department of Education, and between universities and school districts.

The teacher educator organization, California Council on the Education of Teachers, followed the committee's proceedings closely. Teacher educators appeared threatened by initiatives that might reduce course work (jobs) or their exclusive authority to recommend candidates for credentials. While agreeing that a supervised internship would be valuable, the California Council recommended that the requirements for a permanent credential be satisfied either through formal course work in an "approved" college or by completing an alternative "Commission approved" in-service program that had been collaboratively designed and implemented by a school district, a teacher training center, and the university.

*The discussion of issues relating to the fifth year of study, which is scheduled for January 8, 1981, will mark the fourth recent effort by the Commission to achieve some level of consensus regarding those issues, and to formulate proposals for action. At our December 1980, meeting, some frustration was expressed by our Chair Robert Salley at the glacial pace of our deliberations. ...As one of the primary contributors to this marathon of talk, I feel some responsibility for our plight. I must confess considerable difficulty in sorting out the tangles of this particular issue in that many of them relate to other discussions and other issues... (David Levering, January 1981).*

After a year of meetings, Vice Chairman David Levering wrote the above quote to his fellow Commissioners about the glacial pace of the proceedings and laid out four hypotheses to guide policy. Levering's first hypothesis addressed "Mr. Ryan's contention" that subject matter and initial teacher preparation could be squeezed into four years. Levering argued that his arrangement contributed to students' already overly pragmatic determination to learn only what they "need," and he felt that the first four-years should be devoted exclusively to subject

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<sup>11</sup> CTPL Minutes, December 3-5, 1980

matter. Under four-year arrangements, there had been many complaints from academic professors that education courses were cutting into their curricula. If teachers were to be selected from the “upper intellectual strata,” the pool should come from graduates rather than undergraduates. Levering concluded that undergraduate subject matter preparation should be separated from graduate teacher preparation. This position advocated the status quo.<sup>12</sup>

Levering’s second hypothesis stated that the separation between preservice and in-service needed to be linked. Evidence suggested that preservice programs end too abruptly and adversely affected the teacher’s socialization process. Many experienced teachers needed to have their skills improved, but many in-service programs appeared to be ineffective. He suggested that Life Credentials be eliminated and in-service renewal requirements be imposed.

In his third hypothesis, Levering stated that, “We should stop talking about professional education as a ‘fifth year’.” The committee had heard considerable testimony suggesting that teacher training should be spread over two to three years and include college preparation, an internship and ongoing support. There was a consensus that a preliminary credential should be issued upon completion of the initial training and a permanent credential issued after the internship. He noted that the internship and support systems would require substantial expenditures.

Levering’s fourth hypothesis pleaded for people to overcome self-serving forces that fragmented the educational governance among universities, schools and agencies and hindered problem solving in schools. “Beginning teachers, experienced teachers, college faculties, and boards of education must be encouraged to identify more completely with the traditions and direction of their profession.”<sup>13</sup>

### **Studies, Hearings, Commissions**

During the mid-1980s, studies, conferences, hearings and a commission were inaugurated to find solutions to stem the rapid turnover among beginning teachers. According to national

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<sup>12</sup> CTPL Minutes, January 8-9, 1981



data, forty percent of new teachers left teaching after five years, and only fifty percent remained in the classroom after ten years. These studies concentrated on ways to attract quality people, train them well, retain them in the classroom, and continually upgrade their skills. Although their conclusions are remarkably similar, they did not always agree with the self-interests of stakeholder groups.

With the election of a new State Superintendent and with a number of national reports such as *Nation at Risk*, declaring America's the system in crisis, education captured the public attention and became a legislative priority. Within California *Nation* inspired two immediate studies. In 1981, the influential California Business Roundtable engaged Berman, Weiler Associates, a research firm, to study on how to improve California's education system. Its report, *The California Roundtable's Proposal for a New Certification Process*, suggested a major credential reform. Specifically, it recommended that all prospective teachers pass a written, criterion-referenced subject matter examination; that beginning teachers undergo a three-year internship period and be assisted and evaluated by mentor teachers; that there be two levels of credentials; that local districts assume a major responsibility in teacher training; that secondary teachers pass a subject matter examination every seven years to be re-certified; that a bachelor's degree be required for emergency credentials; and that a special certificate be created for outstanding individuals with special skills and experience.

### **National and California Panels**

During the summer of 1981 the Commission appointed two panels, the National Panel and the California Panel, to review the Commission's mission and make recommendations on future directions for Commission activities. The national panel met in July and the California panel met one month later. Both panels expressed disappointment with the Commission and urged it to take a leadership role in teacher education.<sup>14</sup>

Aside from the disappointment expressed about the Commission's progress, these two panels reinforced and added to the wide array of recommendations that would eventually become part of its eventual reform package. The most important recommendations involved creating

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<sup>13</sup> CTPL Minutes, January 8-9, 1981

a two-step credential (Preliminary and Clear), giving beginning teachers support, and issuing Clear Credentials on the basis of an assessment of performance. In addition, the panels recommended that a basic skills test be required of all teacher candidates, preservice and in-service education be linked, professional growth requirements be imposed, internship type programs be initiated, and recognition be given to excellent teaching.

In the recommendations aimed at teacher training institutions, the most prominent were to establish mission statements, goals and objectives, and strong links between pedagogical instruction and field experiences. They were also advised to become more responsive to the needs of schools, integrate subject matter and pedagogy, and raise admissions standards to attract high quality candidates.

The Panels recommended that the Commission be reconstituted with a majority of professional (teacher) educators. On a more practical side, it was recommended that the Commission seek adequate funding, become substantially involved in legislative efforts, establish a pedagogical knowledge base, explore internship models for teacher training, compile annual status reports, undertake writing policy papers, continue program approval, seek ways to deregulate teacher training, impose more methodology requirements, replace the National Teachers Examinations with California's own examinations, reduce misassignment of teachers, and curtail Emergency Credentials.<sup>15</sup>

It appears that the Panels accepted recommendations from all quarters, did not prioritize any, and eliminated few. Some were almost contradictory, such as exploring internship models, as opposed to imposing additional methodological requirements and continuing program review, as opposed to deregulation of teacher training. However, the recommendations did represent views held by the various stakeholder groups and the dilemmas facing the agency. Indeed, most of the proposals were eventually enacted in one form or another.

Also in 1981, the Education Round Table on Educational Opportunity was formed in by University of California President David Saxon to study issues and problems relating to education. Its August 1983 report, *Improving the Attractiveness of the K-12 Teaching Profession in California*, stated that while "an attempt to improve the public image of

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<sup>14</sup> Brown, 1981

teachers may make teaching more attractive in the short run," significant improvement "will require fundamental changes in the profession itself to make it more of a profession." As in some of the previous reports, it called for higher standards of entry, a career ladder, high quality training programs, mentors for new teachers and meaningful evaluations for teachers throughout their careers.

### **California Basic Educational Skills Test (CBEST)**

During 1981 and 1982 Assemblyman Gary K. Hart made two attempts to require teachers to pass a basic skills test. Hart was the author of a 1976 law mandating that all students meet local district proficiency standards in reading, writing and mathematics to receive a high school diploma. Students who were scheduled to graduate in June of 1981 were the first class impacted by Hart's pupil proficiency law.

In advocating for the teacher proficiency law Hart shared what he viewed as compelling evidence to support a teacher proficiency test requirement. Starting in 1978, the Lemon Grove School District administered district-devised tests in grammar, spelling and mathematics to prospective teachers and aides who had been screened for job interviews on the basis of a promising written application. Test difficulty was set at the 8<sup>th</sup> grade for reading and writing and the 7<sup>th</sup> grade for math. The teacher applicants were required to answer 80% of the questions correctly—35% of the candidates failed one or more of the tests. Classroom aide applicants were required to get a 75% passing mark—55% of them failed one or more of the tests. Test difficulty was then revised downward to 7<sup>th</sup> grade for reading and writing and 6<sup>th</sup> grade for math. Still, over 20% of the prospective teachers, and over 30% of the prospective aides, failed one or more of the exams. Results from the Los Angeles Unified School District were similar. For three consecutive years, at least 13% of persons holding a teaching credential and applying for initial employment with the district failed a district-devised test in basic English usage.

Meanwhile, Professor James Coleman and other education researchers reported, in "The Case for Teacher Education at Selective Liberal Arts Colleges," October 1980, Phi Delta Kappa

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<sup>15</sup> Brown, 1981

Magazine, that “the verbal ability of teachers is one of the only school ‘input factors’ that significantly affects verbal achievement of students.” The same researchers found that both verbal and quantitative scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and Graduate Record Exam of undergraduates preparing for teaching careers were declining at a rate that exceeding the national decline among all examinees. In 1980, SAT scores of high school seniors who planned to major in education were 48 points below the national average in math and 35 points below in the verbal component. An April 1981 *Newsweek Magazine* article, “Teachers Are in Trouble,” reported that 89% of citizens surveyed for the Gallop Poll believed teachers should be required to pass a competency test prior to employment.

In arguing for passage of AB 757, Hart shared teachers’ writing samples given to him by concerned parents. The parents were alarmed by what they considered significant errors in the teachers’ notes and wondered out loud whether these teachers would be capable of assisting children to pass the local district proficiency test. In presenting the teacher proficiency measure to the Legislature Hart said, “If standards in basic skills are appropriate for high school graduates, they should also apply to all those involved in classroom teaching.” AB 757 was vigorously opposed by the California Teachers Association until Hart amended the measure deleting the requirement that all practicing teachers pass the exam. The measure then passed with just a handful of “no” votes.

The California law specified that, starting March 1, 1982, persons enrolled in educator credential programs would have to pass the test to receive a credential. Those who had already received a credential, but had not yet been hired would be required to pass the test prior to employment. The teacher testing law specified that the California State Department of Education was responsible for developing a model basic skills examination and the Commission was responsible for its administration. Hart had confidence in the State Department of Education, particularly in the Department’s testing division, because the Department had previously provided high quality guidance to school districts reading development of local pupil proficiency exams.

The compromise between Hart and the California Teachers Association averted problems encountered by other states in the use of basic skills exams. In “Teacher Education and Teacher Testing” Gregory Anrig, President of the Educational Testing Service, described

what he called “troubling signs in the teacher testing movement.” Anrig observed that twenty-one states required students to pass a test before entering a teacher education program, and that thirty-two states, by 1988, would have a testing requirement for teacher certification. Beginning a conversation that would last into the next two decades, he cautioned against making continued accreditation of teacher preparation programs dependent upon the test performance of prospective teachers who were completing such programs. He said, “such use fails to recognize that from 60 to 80 percent of the college preparation received by a prospective teacher is in academic departments other than the department or college of education.” Anrig also wrote:

A second area of concern regarding teacher testing has arisen in Arkansas and Texas. In the course of enacting comprehensive educational reform laws in both states, a requirement was included that all practicing teachers – regardless of years of service and satisfactory ratings by their school supervisors – would have to pass a one-time “functional academic skills” or “literacy” test to retain their teaching certificate. Such a testing requirement is unprecedented for any other occupation requiring state licensure or certification. To put an experienced teacher’s professional career on the line solely on the basis of a mandatory, one-time test is both an injustice to the teacher and a misuse of tests. Educational Testing Service and the NTE Policy Council, in an unprecedented action for test development organizations, have refused to allow the use of NTE tests for this purpose in either Texas or Arkansas.

Joining a debate that would ensue for the next two decades in California, Anrig wrote:

A third area that must be of profound concern to all of us in education is the effect of the teacher testing movement on access of minorities to the teaching force of American schools. Educational Testing Service has recently published two research reports – one on the general impact of state testing policies on the teaching profession and one specifically on the impact on teacher selection of NTE use by states. These reports present data that document the effect of current state testing policies on Black and Hispanic access to teaching. ...The ETS research reports conclude that, by the

year 2000, if there is no significant change in the current status of teacher preparation, the percentage of minorities in the teaching force of the United States could be cut almost in half from its current level of approximately 12 percent. This decline will be taking place at the same time as the proportion of minority students enrolled in American schools is increasing dramatically.

### **Shaping the First Comprehensive Legislative Reform Proposal**

In the Fall of 1981, in a flurry of Commission activity, five “concept papers” were prepared and presented to the Commission in the Fall of 1981, providing the basis for the Commission’s proposed legislation. Newly hired consultant David Wright presented the first paper on professional preparation, advocating the creation of a two-step teaching credential. A five-year preliminary credential would be issued only when the candidates had met performance and subject matter standards. Colleges would be responsible for assessing beginning teacher’s teaching knowledge and competence based upon standards set by the Commission. To insure the quality of preparation programs, the Commission would continue to conduct periodic program reviews. To encourage colleges to improve their programs, they would be given greater flexibility.

Coordinator Richard Mastain proposed changes for subject matter standards. He proposed that the term “waiver” be replaced with the phrase “approved program of academic preparation.” Subject matter requirements could be satisfied either by completing and approved program in California or by passing an examination (appealing, in particular, to out-of-state prepared candidates). Mastain proposed subject matter programs be approved by the Commission on a basis of core and supplemental courses, rather than on broad determination of “scope and content.” Mastain suggested that the question of using examinations to measure subject matter competence be reexamined.

Coordinator Sidney Inglis discussed preparation leading to the advanced “professional credential.” After gaining employment, beginning teachers would have a “network of assistance,” and issuance of the permanent credential would be based on teaching ability. Support and assessment components would be linked to preservice preparation and in-service growth and development. Program requirements would include an individualized program of

study requiring 24-semester units at a college or university, to be jointly designed by the teacher, the school district and the college. Beginning teachers would be given two years to complete their programs, and both the school district and the college would “sign off” to certify completion. The term “fifth year” was to be eliminated.

David Wright presented the fourth and fifth concept papers. He proposed eliminating the Life Credential and imposing “professional growth” renewal requirements every five years. Renewal would be based on “adequate and sufficient evidence of professional growth,” to be determined locally, and whose terms would be negotiated between the school district and local union. In the fifth paper, Wright proposed setting higher standards for Emergency Credentials. A Bachelor’s Degree would be required rather than 90 college units.<sup>16</sup>

By January 1982, the reform legislation was in draft form. In the meantime, Assemblymember Gary Hart had formed a task force to study credentialing which Commission representatives. In February, Chairman Salley reported that Hart’s task force had been “very helpful” in looking over the material supplied, by the Commission. He suggested that the process was moving “in a positive direction.”<sup>17</sup>

### **The Commission’s First Reform Bill (Hart) – 1982**

*Much of the CTA opposition to the bill was as a result of the Life Credential issue. Though Marilyn Bittle did not mention it, CTA locals across the state bombarded their members with the falsehood that “their Life Credentials were going to be taken away.” ...The bill intended to do no such thing. It did, however, eliminate the possibility of obtaining a Life Credential after June 30, 1983... (CTPL, Chair Robert Salley).*

Whatever doubts there were about the Commission, they did not stop Assemblymember Hart from introducing Commission sponsored legislation in March 1982 formulated from the concept papers. Almost immediately, under pressure from the CTA, Hart removed the provision to eliminate the Life Credential. However, negotiations resulted in a compromise

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<sup>16</sup> CTPL Minutes, December 2-4, 1981

proposal—a Life Credential would not be issued until a teacher had taught for two years under an advanced credential. In an effort to persuade the CTA, Salley, Executive Secretary John Brown and Consultant David Wright met with CTA President Ed Foglia, CTA lobbyist Sharon Bowman, and Assemblymember Hart. They attempted to convince Foglia that retaining the Life Credential would neutralize any effort to encourage ongoing renewal. Foglia responded that all teachers should engage in renewal; however, the credentialing system should not be used to force that purpose. He felt that many teachers already undertook renewal activities, and “those who don’t—we ought to attempt to educate them to the necessity of renewal.”<sup>18</sup> The Commission’s efforts were to no avail, and Hart did not think it was feasible to move the bill against the CTA’s opposition.

The California School Boards Association (CBSA) was supportive of the reform measure, especially proposals to promote ongoing professional development, limit Life Credentials, and create a supportive environment for new teachers. However, CSBA was against requiring a Bachelor’s Degree for Emergency Credentials and restricting teachers to their areas of expertise.<sup>19</sup> The California Federation of Teachers (CFT) favored the bill, and in contrast to the CTA, wanted the Life Credential eliminated.<sup>20</sup>

Chairman Salley attended an April Assembly Education Committee hearing and reported that CTA wanted to remove the 24-unit requirement for the advanced credential. However, Hart assured the Commission that he would not remove this requirement. Going against the Commission’s wishes, provisions were added to the bill to make it easier for out-of-state teachers with degrees in education to obtain a credential. A month later, the bill passed out of the Assembly Education Committee and went to the Ways and Means Committee where it also passed.<sup>21</sup>

By late June, before the bill went to the Senate Education Committee, Hart changed his mind about eliminating the Life Credential. “I’ve always said that I philosophically opposed the

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<sup>17</sup> CTPL Minutes, February 4-5, 1982

<sup>18</sup> Bond, 1989c

<sup>19</sup> Baumann, 1982

<sup>20</sup> California Legislature, 1982

<sup>21</sup> CTPL Minutes, April 1-2, 1982



Life Credential...But I felt that in the Assembly, the bill's survival would be in jeopardy if the Life Credential were done away with.”<sup>22</sup>

CTC's role in taking a stand against the CTA backfired. In August, Hart's bill was defeated in the Senate Education Committee. CTA declared that the 24-unit requirement as “anti-teacher.” At the Commission's next meeting, Chairman Salley stated:

*I think that what our effort is, is pro-public education and for the profession and that what we have is an effort to say to the public that the profession is important. It is important enough that we are willing to address one of the critical problems in the training process. Those are real problems that we tried to address clearly, and to be attacked as anti-teacher is truly unfair.*<sup>23</sup>

The *Sacramento Union's* Michael Fallon told of Senator Ed Davis' resentment of CTA lobbying. Davis criticized CTA's influence on the Education Committee... “I've wasted two years on this committee,” said Davis, adding that he would ask to be removed from the committee and be reassigned.

Fallon's article mentioned another dimension to CTA's opposition. “The Commission has heavy representation of federation (California Federation of Teachers) members, and this appears to be one factor in the CTA's determined opposition to the bill.”<sup>24</sup> More accurately, three Commission members had CFT affiliation (teacher representatives Robert Salley and Nancy Flanigan, and faculty representative David Levering); all three were involved in the Commission's leadership, and were the driving force behind the Commission's reform agenda. These appointments had been the result of the CTA's poor relations with Governor Jerry Brown. The CTA had not supported Brown when he ran for governor initially, and had opposed him when he ran for a second term. In contrast, CFT was affiliated with labor, had strong ties to the Democratic Party, had supported Brown's candidacy and consequently, had the advantage when appointments were made to the Commission. CTA President Marilyn Bittle wrote an article in the organization's monthly newspaper, Action, praising the CTA's

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<sup>22</sup> Baumann, 1982

<sup>23</sup> Sacramento Union, August 16, 1982

<sup>24</sup> Sacramento Union, August 16, 1982

role in defeating Hart's bill. In October, CTA offered Robert Salley an opportunity to write a rebuttal for the next issue of Action. In his response, Salley wrote:

*...Unfortunately, President Bittle continues to perpetuate some of the misunderstandings about that bill.*

*When Marilyn Bittle criticizes the Hart bill for requiring a new teacher to be "placed on hold" for five years while taking 24-units before getting an advanced credential, she displays a failure to understand the present law which also has a two-stage requirement, the Preliminary and the Clear. Presently, after a four-year degree and professional preparation, a candidate receives a Preliminary Credential. He or she then has five years within which to take an additional full academic year to receive a Clear Credential.*

*However, the present system is deficient. Many, if not most, teachers prepared in California colleges take professional preparation during a graduate year. Therefore, they bypass a Preliminary Credential and receive a Clear without ever really teaching. Then, by teaching only two years they obtain a Life Credential and have no further obligations to upgrade their skills. The craft of teaching, as understood by most successful career teachers, is not learned in a semester of student teaching or in only two classroom years...*

*President Bittle has suggested that all teachers continually renew themselves professionally on an ongoing basis already. We all know too many who do not. Upon reaching the top of the salary schedule in 10 or 15 years, they stop growing. Some stop well before that time.<sup>25</sup>*

The CTA was representing teachers who did not want to have additional credential requirements. Very few teachers believed that additional education courses would contribute significantly to their success in the classroom. When asked, teachers claimed that on-the-job

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<sup>25</sup> CTPL Minutes, November 4-5, 1982

training and information from practicing teachers were the most important sources of training, not college professors. As a result, most teachers held education in low regard and resented the intrusion of additional credential requirements. However, “A Nation at Risk” was about to be published. A national reform movement was about to be born. Even the CTA’s formidable lobbying clout would not be able to avoid the public clamor for improvement.

### **Learning from Experience**

If the Commission was going to pursue a legislative reform, it had to develop better strategies. To this end, the Commission’s Legislative Committee held a workshop with lobbyists representing the CTA, CFT, school boards, school nurses and librarians, and Senate Education Committee staff. They were told that if the agency was going to pursue legislation, individual Commissioners must be active and get to know legislators, especially those from their own districts. The Commissioners also needed to know the strengths of their proposal along with potential problems. Legislators wanted to know about public support for reforms, measured by the volume of mail, telephone calls, and visitors.<sup>26</sup> Commissioners were told that they needed a broader base of support, teacher organizations and teacher educators. Some workshop attendees advised the timing was wrong for a major reform bill, since it was an election year. Others suggested that the Commission proposal contained too much, too fast. Chances would improve if reform pieces were moved through the Legislature on a step-by-step basis rather than in a comprehensive package. Lastly, the Committee members were told that they had to build consensus among their own members. Legislators had received conflicting messages from different Commission members. In a general statement, a participant made the observation that professionalism cannot be legislated but, rather, had to come from training and individuals in the occupation.

High standards and meaningful intellectual requirements make an expert teacher. The profession must be more demanding. When you raise requirements to have teachers who are

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<sup>26</sup> CTPL Minutes, October 6-8, 1982

able to hold their heads up and talk to the public with real knowledge—then you will be able to provide them with the compensation they should get.<sup>27</sup>

### **Transitions in Leadership, Politics and Individuals**

At the end of 1982, Robert Salley had reached the limit for service as Chairman, and David Levering was elected Chairman.<sup>28</sup> There was little change in philosophy or direction with this election. As Vice Chairman and a fellow CTC member, Levering and Salley had worked closely together for years. Moreover, Salley remained on the Executive Committee. However, by December 1984, when Salley's and Levering's terms expired, the CFT coalition that had led the Commission since 1979 ended. For the first time, there was an openly contested election for chair. Jerry Brown-appointed Alice Petrossian and Deukmejian-appointed Mary Jane Pearson ran for the position while Petrossian filled the role of acting chair. Finally after a protracted process, in May 1985 Alice Petrossian won the position on an 8 to 5 vote.

It was well known that if Petrossian were elected, she would lead an effort to dismiss John Brown. As Executive Secretary, Brown had initially been successful in initiating several important projects, over time, however, he was perceived as unable to sustain major initiatives. He gave the impression of being unsympathetic to the needs of higher education and, as a result, failed to build credibility among its representatives. His occasional untoward statements in public about Commissioners or legislators had tarnished his reputation and diminished his effectiveness. In July, Brown "resigned" in executive session, and Licensing Coordinator Richard K. Mastain was asked to take over as Acting Executive Secretary. Several months later, Mastain assumed the position on a permanent basis.

At the same time it sustained significant changes in leadership, the Commission developed nine new goals for the agency. These were to:

- confer with agencies, groups and individuals with the purpose of improving agency policies; and governing stable funding;

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<sup>27</sup> CTPL Minutes, October 6-8, 1982

<sup>28</sup> CTPL Minutes, December 1-3, 1982

- review each credential area periodically;
- introduce legislation to require teacher candidates to pass a performance assessment and a subject matter examination that included essay questions;
- establish high standards for educator competence and moral fitness;
- ensure that teachers are assigned to areas directly related to their preparation;
- effectively communicate the Commission's views to individuals, groups and the public;
- establish a system to collect and disseminate information on teacher education, credentialing, and teacher assignments; and
- improve agency efficiency through the use of modern office techniques and technology.

With a dynamic and aggressive chair, a new consensus seeking executive secretary, and a new set of goals, the Commission was finally ready to build its reputation and exert leadership. It decided, first, to improve its links with important legislators by honoring them, including a Assemblymember Chuck Bader and others who had been highly critical of its discipline procedures and had accused it of laxness. In January 1986, Bader addressed the Commission's first meeting of the new year. He stated, "our goals are identical, even though our conclusions about how to reach those goals may be different." He now offered to work with the Commission to improve the quality of teacher preparation, particularly on career progression extending from intern to a fully independent teacher, with an option to become a mentor teacher, a curriculum specialist or an administrator. According to one long-time observer, this strategy of honoring legislators was a smart move. To improve communications, the Commission issued its newsletter on a monthly basis in a more polished format.

Secondly, if the Commission was to gain passage for its reforms, it had to work more closely with interest groups. "Informal discussions" were held with representatives of associations, institutions and agencies giving Commissioners opportunities to gather advice on its reform proposals. Some groups clearly mapped out their positions while others were less

forthright—probably because they did not want to appear self-serving in public. The California State University representative stated that it was "extremely interested in taking greater initiative in working more with the Commission" but clearly avoided enunciating CSU's long time agenda item—deregulating teacher preparation.

Other representatives were more specific about needed reforms. School boards wanted a two-year internship for beginning teachers, alternative routes to certification, more generalized credential authorizations, a subject matter test for beginning teachers, the elimination of emergency credentials (while leaving districts "some way to put teachers in front of all classes") and continuing school board representation on the Commission. ACSA's specific concern related to additional representation on the Commission; it questioned the Commission's role in determining the competence of teachers—a role, it argued more appropriately a function of local school districts. The State Department made no mention of its desire to place credentialing under the State Superintendent but expressed concerns about the teacher misassignment problem. CTA announced that it was again sponsoring legislation to put a majority of teachers on the Commission. After stating that its first priority was to reduce class size, CFT argued for eliminating the Teacher Trainee program, for replacing emergency credentials with the summer-internship summer training program, providing incentives for minority teacher candidates, implementing "State Bar-type" subject matter examinations, ensuring that colleges adequately funded their teacher training programs, developing models that encourage teacher participation in decision-making, and moving toward a peer evaluation system. The Los Angeles Unified School District's desires were directed toward staffing schools to meet its expanding enrollment. However, in the credentialing area, Los Angeles wanted to extend the Teacher Trainee program into elementary schools and find ways to "deal with the misassignment of teachers."

### **A Name Change for the Commission**

During the 1982 legislative session, Assemblymember Teresa Hughes introduced a bill to change the agency's name to the "Ryan Commission." Her intention was to honor Congressman Leo Ryan, who had been killed in 1979 while investigating a cult in Guyana. The Commission attempted to persuade Hughes to change the name to

the Ryan Commission on Teacher Preparation and Licensing, the Commission on Teacher Preparation and Licensing (Ryan Commission). However, as the bill eventually worked its way through the Legislature, the name became the Commission on Teacher Credentialing (CTC). The name change took effect on the first day of 1983.

### **Deukmejian and Honig are Elected**

In November 1982, there was a dramatic change in two of the state's top elective offices. Conservative Republican George Deukmejian was elected Governor and Independent (former Democrat) Bill Honig was elected Superintendent of Public Instruction. Deukmejian and Honig stood in sharp contrast to their predecessors Jerry Brown and Wilson Riles, and would have significant effects on future educational events. At the same time, Assemblymember Gary Hart was elected to the Senate. All three had been opposed by teacher organizations.

### **The Second Reform Bill (Bergeson) – 1983**

Immediately after the defeat of its first reform package in 1982, Coordinator David Wright presented the reform plans for the following year. Some accommodations were being made, but the Commission was steadfast on most of its positions. Rather than stating the Life Credentials would be eliminated, the draft bill now stated that the advanced teaching credential would have to be renewed every five years. For renewal, teachers would have to supply evidence of “successful service” and complete an “individual program of professional growth” developed jointly by the teacher and school district. Concern was expressed by school districts about the cost of having an experienced teacher help a beginning teacher, and Commission staff was directed to explore ways to implement a support system without incurring high cost. Nevertheless, the Commission felt strongly that school districts should

be mandated to provide advanced training. The body also felt the advanced requirement should be a combination of “systematic staff development” and college courses.

Soon after Senator Hart took office in January, Commission Vice Chair Frances Berry (a constituent of Hart’s) arranged a meeting with Commissioners Levering, Salley, Executive Secretary Brown, and herself. Hart was planning to introduce the Commission’s reform package again in the same form as at the previous session. Although willing to receive amendments, he was a little more cautious. He wanted to know the rationale for the bill and how it would be received by various interest groups. Deciding not to make the same mistake twice, executive Secretary Brown met with CTA officials to find ways to make the bill more acceptable to the organization. As a result, amendments were proposed to strengthen the provisions for beginning teacher support, insure that advance programs would not be costly for school districts and teachers, add additional protections for beginning teachers, make the advanced certificates valid for life, and clarify the minimum requirements for renewal.<sup>29</sup>

Another set of amendments responded to higher education. The primary one was to “sunset” the program approval process. This was a long-time agenda item of the University of California, which viewed program review as an intrusion into its autonomy. Other amendments, such as the requirements for 30-units of pedagogy and retention of courses in communication skills, health education, mainstreaming, and knowledge of the U.S. Constitution, sought to protect higher education’s turf. Another amendment proposed eliminating the State Board’s authority to reject Commission regulations.<sup>30</sup>

In March, the Commission’s Legislative Committee met with Hart and Senate Education Committee Consultants Linda Bond and Karen Lowrey. Hart informed the group that the amendments eliminating Life Credentials and the requirements for professional growth had been eliminated from the bill. Apparently skeptical about the advisability of such proposals, Bond and Lowrey had counseled Hart wanted to determine whether research showed a link between professional development improved teaching performance before proceeding with new mandates.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> CTC Minutes, February 2-4, 1983

<sup>30</sup> CTC Minutes, February 2-4, 1983

<sup>31</sup> CTC Minutes, March 3-4, 1983



## Major Reform Bills

With the election of a new State Superintendent and with a number of national reports such as “A Nation at Risk” declaring America’s system in crisis, education captured public attention and became a legislative priority. Several major reform bills were formulated, most prominently by Assemblymember Hughes, Senator Hart, and State Superintendent Honig persuaded Assemblymember Marian Bergeson and Senator Ed Davis to introduce his proposals. Honig’s bills contained provisions for expanding the school year, increasing academic requirements, offering higher starting salaries to beginning teachers, relaxing procedures to dismiss teachers, reducing the probationary period to two years, expanding the state’s testing program and toughening student discipline standards. Although the bills did not eliminate the Life Credential, they required the credential to be renewed every five years with local districts determining the requirements. Teacher unions found it difficult to accept the provisions for easier dismissal. Honig’s proposals were estimated to cost \$973 million while governor Deukmejian had proposed an increase of \$374 million.<sup>32</sup>

When Honig’s package did not receive the support the CTA, a *San Francisco Examiner* article explained:

In the last five years the CT

provisions of the plan, such as changes in requirements for tenure and teacher layoffs.

Moreover, CTA faces criticism from some parents and school administrators who say the union’s wage demands are one reason many districts are forced to close schools and cut programs to a minimum. That is the case in San Jose, where the teachers are the highest paid among the states larger districts....

Some school administrators say the CTA lobby has a stranglehold on Sacramento lawmakers to the detriment of local school policy...Honig further

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<sup>32</sup> Bond, 1989c, *Sacramento Bee*, March 16, 1983

irked CTA officials by saying he planned to get rid of a significant number of incompetent teachers and to whip the state's lethargic educational system into shape.

Now, Honig's \$1 billion educational reform plan is in the Legislature. For that package to be successful, Honig said, "I don't think we need their support, but what we don't need is holy war. If we were trying to eliminate collective bargaining, for example, they would be up in arms. But if you're talking as we're talking—reasonable changes—they may oppose it, but it is not a life-or-death thing to them.

But [Executive Director] Flynn said CTA will support Honig's reforms, or those being offered by Gov. Deukmejian and Senate Education Committee Chairman Hart, D-Santa Barbara, only if they are premised on there being adequate funds to support that."

In addition, Flynn said, referring to several of Honig's proposals he terms unacceptable, the CTA "will fight, with every ounce of vigor we've got, a series of anti-teacher measures disguised as reforms."<sup>33</sup>

## **Second Reform Bill – 1983**

At the Commission's April meeting, Senate Education Committee Consultant Linda Bond made a presentation. She stated that Senator Hart would like to incorporate some of the Commission's reform proposals such as the two-step credential into the Senator's major reform bill. However, she said Hart wanted other proposals, such as eliminating Life Credentials and stiffening reciprocity requirements, in another bill. Bond stated that as a former teacher Hart had been persuaded by arguments that the school site "clinical" or

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<sup>33</sup> San Francisco Examiner, April 3, 1983

bottom up professional development model was more effective than a top down model suggested by the Commission. She said Hart was against linking credential renewal to college courses and instead wanted them linked to periodic evaluations. Hart maintained that there should be more feedback to beginning teachers by administrators who were in a position to encourage teacher growth, and at the same time, encourage teachers not interested in growth to leave the occupation.<sup>34</sup>

While Hart was sifting through the Commission's reform proposals, Assemblymember Bergeson appeared ready to carry most of package. When approached by Executive Secretary Brown, Bergeson expressed a willingness to place almost all of the Commission's proposals into her bill, but was still interested in "streamlining" the credentialing system. Brown suggested to the Commission that it choose either Hart's or Bergeson's bill for their reform package. Impatient and agitated, the Commission wanted action. In an abrupt switch, the Commission chose Bergeson's bill and immediately began seeking amendments. Most significant were amendments to reinstate the Commission's earlier Emergency Credential and renewal requirements. Instead of 90-hours of professional development to renew a credential, the Commission now wanted 150-hours, as recommended in a Business Roundtable report.<sup>35</sup> When Bergeson's bill was heard before the Assembly Education Committee in April, the bill analysis stated that:

The Major policy question

the quality of teacher performance.<sup>36</sup>

### **Major Reform Bills Take Priority**

Meanwhile, the Legislature was debating how to fund the major reform bills. Assembly Democrats were arguing for a tax increase, and Assembly Speaker Willie Brown proposed a tax increase on cigarettes, liquor, and people with high incomes. Republicans resisted, saying that the proposal didn't "face up to the fiscal realities of California or to the election of Republican Governor Deukmejian, who opposes tax increases." Speaker Brown hoped for

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<sup>34</sup> Bond, 1989b; Bond, 1989c, CTC Minutes, April 7-8, 1983

<sup>35</sup> Bond, 1989c, CTC Minutes, April 7-8, 1983

<sup>36</sup> California Legislature, 1983c

“a negotiated settlement with the governor.”<sup>37</sup> In May, Bergeson’s bill passed out of the Assembly Education Committee. Following the Commission’s top down approach, new amendments proposed that the agency determine the courses and activities that would be acceptable for credential renewal and that each school would have a “professional development advisor” to certify each teacher’s continuing education program.<sup>38</sup> However, by this time, the bill was losing steam. The major reform bills were being given so much attention; other bills had taken a lower priority. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Commission’s only chance, in 1983, would be to include pieces of their reform into either Hart’s or Hughes’ major reform bills.<sup>39</sup>

### **Hughes-Hart Education Reform Act of 1983 (SB 813)**

By June of 1983, Honig and the legislative leaders were experiencing success in moving the educational reform package. Both the Assembly and Senate had passed bills that would provide a \$700 to \$840 million in additional funds to schools. Some Republicans were supportive, and leaders in both parties were talking about a variety of ways to raise taxes. Deukmejian was willing to add another \$100 million to the \$350 million he had previously proposed and add \$700 million the following year if the legislators would only “hold the line on spending” in 1983. He said he would veto any bill that would raise taxes.

Operating independently from the Legislature, Honig was calling Deukmejian’s offer “too little, too late,” and proposed a quarter-cent sales tax increase. Deukmejian cried foul and said Honig had not advocated tax increases during his campaign for Superintendent. Honig responded that he was being consistent with his campaign pledges. He had always said additional money must be linked with reforms, and since he was never asked to make a commitment on tax increases, he never ruled them out.

Bill Honig was an independent outsider and apparently gave little thought to adhering to Sacramento’s customs and protocols for coalition politics. Democratic legislators were

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<sup>37</sup> Sacramento Bee, April 22, 1983

<sup>38</sup> Sacramento Bee, April 23, 1983

<sup>39</sup> CTC Minutes, June 1-3, 1983

determined to hold out for full funding, but Honig was impatient, went behind the legislators' backs, and cut a deal with Deukmejian. In doing so, he lost the legislators' trust.

Although members felt betrayed by Honig, the legislative leaders decided to fight for full funding anyway. "It's still winnable," Hart said, adding that Honig's action was "a surprise and diversionary tactic, but it's not going to stop us." The reform bills were already in a Senate/Assembly conference committee, and Democrats wanted to confront Deukmejian on this high profile educational issue. Democrats proposed a \$2.7 billion omnibus reform despite the threat of a veto. Deukmejian was in a political corner. He signed the Hughes-Hart Reform Act (SB 813) with its many provisions, however, he "blue penciled" \$1.9 billion that was intended to fund the second year of the reform.

### **Major Implications for Credentialing**

Towards the end of the negotiations on the Hughes-Hart reform bill, Governor Deukmejian presented a list of items he wanted included. Apparently Assemblymember Bergeson had asked him to eliminate Life Credentials and impose the 150-hour renewal requirements, and as a result, two major planks of the Commission's reform package were included. Meanwhile, at the request of Assemblymember Hughes from Los Angeles, an alternative route to certification was provided that allowed school districts to create their own teacher preparation programs. Called the "Teacher Trainee Certification" program, this was a proposal of the Los Angeles Unified School District, which suffered from a chronic shortage of teachers.

### **Dissatisfaction with the Commission**

During the 1980s several legislators had become dissatisfied with the Commission's performance. The reasons for this dissatisfaction were vague, but most often, the Commission was told that it was not exerting leadership. The agency had spent several years carefully conducting research, setting priorities and assembling a reform package. However, it had handled awkwardly its relations between Hart and Bergeson on its second reform bill. Commission representatives were often absent when credentialing measures were brought before legislative committees. Moreover,

Commission seemed to consume inordinate amounts of meeting time on trivial matters or blurt out disparaging remarks in public about the legislature or the State Board. These missteps drew substantial criticism.

As the dissatisfaction with the Commission grew deeper and Honig's desire to consolidate policy making increased, it was not a surprise when, in April 1984, Assembly Member Chuck Bader altered one of his bills to return credentialing to the State Board and a Bureau of Teacher Credentialing within State Department of Education. Democratic Assembly Member Sam Farr later joined Bader as co-author of the measure.

When the hearing took place in Summer 1984, the bill analysis of Bader's bill stated:

Although these concerns may be legitimate, the issue of abolishing the Commission and transferring its duties . . . is one that could exacerbate the current problems. The Department of Education, which suffered a major reduction last year in the budget (approximately \$6 million), still, appears to be in a state of reorganization, although it is far improved from last year's operation. . . . The staff of the Commission would be transferred along with its functions, but the Department management would still need to reorganize further to accommodate the large staff of the Commission and its duties.

When Bader presented his bill to the joint committees, he accused the Commission of failing to adopt competency standards mandated by the Ryan Act, of being irresponsible in budgeting and staffing, and of not knowing statistical information about credential holders. Bader pointed out the split in educational authority and responsibility. The State Board and Superintendent were responsible for professional development and curriculum development while the Commission was in charge of teacher preparation. Bader argued that, "curriculum development (what to teach) and teacher preparation (how to teach it) should be under the control of the Superintendent. Accountability would thereby be centralized."

Little came from these hearings. The Commons Commission was studying the issues and would eventually make recommendations. Until the results were known, it was decided that both Bader's and Bergeson's bills should not move forward.

## **New Ideas for Reform**

In the fall of 1983, the Assembly Education Committee held two interim hearings on teacher preparation and credentialing, concentrating on five areas of concern—program review, teacher supply and demand, teacher preparation, credentialing out-of-state teachers, and governance. It set forth six legislative recommendations: develop an alternative to program review; develop an effective supply and demand data base; clarify the Commission's role in teacher trainee programs; develop new policies to certify out-of-state teachers; conduct an in depth assessment of the governance of teacher preparation and licensing curriculum and professional development; and develop proposals to upgrade the teaching profession.

During 1984, the Education Round Table invited one hundred of California's educational leaders, researchers and other professionals to participate in an Asilomar symposium to address increasing the attractiveness of teaching. Several significant albeit familiar policy proposals came from this conference. The conferences proposed that a new Professional Standards Board be established and be composed of a majority of practicing teachers. It also called for beginning teacher support, a peer evaluation process, rigorous teacher training courses, a four-step career ladder, reduced distinctions between teachers and administrators, and greater teacher responsibility for policing their own ranks. The group envisioned expanding the teacher's role, decentralizing decision making, changing the role of the principal, and addressing problems beyond the school.

This symposium could not have occurred at a more opportune time. The work of a blue ribbon commission, the California Commission on the Teaching Profession (later known as the Commons Commission, after its chair, Dorman Commons) was just beginning

## **Creation of the Commons Commission**

In the fall of 1983, UC *ex-officio* Commissioner James Guthrie and Stanford Professor Michael Kirst had proposed that the Commission create a blue ribbon commission, charged to find ways to enhance the teaching profession. If handled properly, this new center would gain credibility and prestige, and legislators would find it difficult to ignore the Commission in formulating legislation. But for a variety of reasons, the Commission did not want to undertake this kind of leadership role. It wanted to concentrate on the issues and work plan that had been developed over several years.

The proposal, however, did not die with the Commission's reluctance. The idea of a "blue ribbon" commission had originated in a conversation between Guthrie and Ted Lobman, then Executive Director of the Hewlett Foundation. They had been impressed by the success of a bipartisan and objective blue ribbon commission headed by former Treasury Secretary Stuart Simon in recommending reforms for the Social Security system. Lobman wondered if the same concept could be used in reforming teacher credentialing. Guthrie thought they should try. They met with Honig, who was initially reluctant, but after Lobman's persuasive arguments, warmed to the idea. Once persuaded, Honig wanted to be the single sponsor, but Guthrie and Lobman convinced him that the "blue ribbon" commission needed a broader base of support. In addition to Honig, they sought the sponsorship of Deukmejian, UC's Saxon, CSU Chancellor Ann Reynolds, Senate Education Committee Chair Hart and Assembly Education Committee Chair Hughes. Guthrie and Lobman were not as successful with Deukmejian, Saxon, and Reynolds. The governor's education advisor, William Cunningham, liked the idea, but he candidly admitted that he was unable to persuade the governor to co-sponsor this effort. Saxon and Reynolds declined because they did not want to potentially endanger their relationship with the governor.

Ultimately the California Commission on the Teaching Profession was formed under the chairmanship of Dorman Commons. Senate Education Consultant Linda Bond was hired as the Commission's Executive Director and Dr. Gary Sykes of Stanford University was asked to perform the duties of Research Director. Better known as the "Commons Commission" after its Chairman, the California Commission on the Teaching Profession was a nonpartisan, independent body privately funded by the Hewlett Foundation. An outgrowth of Senate Bill 813 (Hart), the Commission focused on three principal areas: (1) restructuring the teaching career and establishing rigorous professional standards, (2) redesigning the school as a more productive workplace for teachers and students and (3) accelerating the recruitment of capable men and women to teaching.

The Commons Commission, which consisted of "a cross section of California men and women representing different racial, cultural and professional backgrounds," deliberated for 15 months as commissioners listened to hundreds of hours of testimony from parents, teachers, education researchers and others from across the United States. The independent



panel commissioned 17 research papers on aspects of the teaching profession such as compensation, career ladders, alternatives to collective bargaining, and recruitment incentives.

With the help of a marketing research firm, the Commons Commission also conducted a focus group study to determine why former teachers had left the profession. The focus group study observed:

Most of the former teachers surveyed had entered into teaching as a career commitment to students and society. However, former teachers feel that the educational environment has changed dramatically in the last fifteen years. The teachers believe that erosion in the quality of public education in California during the last decade has resulted in a lack of public confidence. The areas of particular concern include: bureaucracy throughout, over-administration at the higher level, shortage of funds, overcrowded classrooms, elimination of special classes/programs, lack of parental involvement/concern and more emphasis on grades than learning and incompetent teachers. In conclusion, study results demonstrate the gravity of the teaching situation in California today. These experienced teachers are unlikely to return to the teaching force unless policymakers substantially improve compensation, working conditions, and community support for the profession of teaching.

The Commissioners resolved to address “a plethora of accumulated problems:”

Our school plants are in disrepair, with a \$2 billion backlog required to bring them up to standards of safety and livability. Our class sizes are the largest in the nation, with the exception of Utah. We are facing an increase of at least 500,000 students by the end of this decade. We live in a society in which knowledge is growing exponentially, but the methods of training teachers and the structure of our school organizations have changed little in the past 85 years.

***Who Will Teach Our Children? The Report of the Commons Commission***

*...This report is indeed the*

*nation, and a society depends on what we do to meet the challenge of providing a quality education to all of our children.*

(Dorman L. Commons, Chairman, California Commission On The Teaching Profession)

In November of 1985 the Commons Commission produced the report, *Who Will Teach Our Children? A Strategy for Improving California's Schools*. The report placed particular emphasis on teacher qualifications:

Perhaps the biggest changes the Commission proposes are in establishing and enforcing professional standards. Instead of basing credentials on the courses an individual sits through, entry into the profession should be based on thorough examinations and assessments, and these exams and assessments should continue at each step of a teacher's career.

The Commons Commission believed that a clear credential should be based on what the teaching candidate knows and is able to do, not merely on the courses taken in college.

In another major departure the Commons Commission recommended that the Commission on Teacher Credentialing be replaced with a California Teaching Standards Board comprised of a majority of teachers and charged with developing the required exams and assessments. The Board would include a separately appointed enforcement unit to administer and evaluate the exams and to take responsibility for sanctions against teachers involved in statutorily prohibited misconduct. The Commission believed that members of the profession should be held accountable for the qualifications and discipline of the profession.

The Commission also suggested that local school districts provide regular information to parents, maintaining that: "parents need to be informed of the conditions for learning at their neighborhood schools." The Commission recommended all schools publish reports at least every two years on the conditions at each school that could affect the process of teaching and learning:

If there is overcrowding, parents need to know. If teachers are teaching outside of their areas of competence, parents need to know. If the buildings are in disrepair or unsafe, parents need to know.

The Commons Commission also recommended the management of schools be restructured:

The principal's role must be more thoroughly defined by California's education community, and new effort must be dedicated to developing training programs for principals. Principals must be team leaders, cooperating with teachers to run schools with greater autonomy at the site level.

According to the Commons Commission, the roles of teachers should be expanded both in breadth and scope. It advised, "teachers should have greater participation in crucial matters such as selection of new teachers, teacher evaluation, schedules, curriculum and student discipline."

Finally, the Commons Commission declared that California must work actively to recruit capable people into teaching. To do so "teachers need to be afforded competitive salaries" they said. "At the college level, work study programs and service-payback fellowships for teaching students will not only help talented future teachers finish school, but will encourage many talented college students who might not otherwise consider teaching to select teaching as a career."

The Commons Commission distributed over 40,000 copies of *Who Will Teach Our Children?* Briefings on the report were held with every major education and civic organization in California. Commissioners convened town meetings across California, in Fresno, Claremont, Los Angeles, Orange County, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco and San Jose. Prior to introducing legislation based upon the Commons Commission recommendations, Senator Gary Hart, Chair of the Senate Education Committee, scheduled two additional meetings for legislators and others—one in Santa Barbara and the other in Oxnard.

The Commons Commission embraced the medical licensure model for the teaching profession, including some of the parlance. Teachers would undergo “rigorous training,” pass “state examinations,” undergo a “residency” under the supervision of a “clinical” professor, and have the opportunity to become a “specialist.” This model would be the model legislative reformers pursued in their quest to make teaching more respectable and to improve public schools.

### **Bader and Honig Try Again**

In 1985, Bader again introduced a bill to place the Commission in the State Department. Finally, in November, a special interim session was held by the Senate Education Committee on Commons Commission report and the Bader bill. Following a morning discussion of the Commons Commission's report, Bader restated his reasons for placing credentialing within the State Department and argued that the Superintendent was presently "shielded from the teacher preparation function." If the state was going to hold him accountable for educational quality, it was necessary to involve him from the first day that the prospective teacher entered college. Without sufficient support, especially from the CTA, the Bader bill could not move through the legislature. The threat of abolishing or moving the Commission had subsided. At the same time, the just-released recommendations of the Commons introduced a new set of dynamics for the credentialing agency.

## **Bergeson's 1986 Bill**

After the Commons Commission report was issued, Senators Hart and Bergeson introduced companion bills based on its recommendations. Hart's measure focused on the school site reform proposals. Bergeson's bill on credential reform proposed an eleven member California Teaching Standards Board and a nine-member Enforcement Board appointed by the Governor. Both new Boards would be fully independent of the State Board of Education. All teaching credentials would become two-staged, requiring a supervised internship prior to full certification. During the residency year, beginning teachers would teach an eighty-percent workload, be supervised by a mentor teacher and a "clinical" professor, and be evaluated by several observers.

The details of Bergeson's legislation were negotiated over a two and a half-year period. As seven key issues were debated as the comprehensive Commons Commission package advanced through the Legislature.

The first issue was the composition of the Standards Board. Representatives of the CTC felt it would be politically difficult to exclude higher education from the voting seats. Moreover, one seat could not speak for all of higher education and CSU Chancellor Reynolds was going to press for CSU's own seat. The Commons Commission had advocated a more limited size, giving teachers a majority, while including members of the public and others representing school board members, administrators and other educators. Honig was demanding a seat, but Bergeson hesitated to place an elected official on the policy board.

Second, at Honig's request, an amendment was added to eliminate CBEST and substitute an examination that included general knowledge and liberal education. The CTC approved of expanding the exam beyond basic skills, but some legislators had strong reservations about how that would impact minorities. Generally, minorities did well on subject matter examinations—material they learned in college—but less well on general knowledge examinations which were more a reflection of background.

Third, the CTC was troubled by the notion of making teacher training exclusively a postgraduate program and asked for the rationale. The Commons Commission believed a postgraduate program was more appropriate under a professional model. In addition, it

would give potential teachers more time to study subject matter during the undergraduate years. The Commons Commission felt that by giving teacher training graduate status, schools of education would have more prestige and credibility within their own institution. Although the CTC agreed that schools of education needed more prestige and respect, they felt that the use of postgraduate status was not a suitable approach. The Commons Commission felt that it was important to provide future teachers with strong subject matter skills, a good general education, and the ability to convey information. Moreover, they felt that something dramatic had to be done to force colleges to recognize the importance of teacher education.

Fourth, there were debates over “professional growth” requirements for credential renewal. The CTC felt that the Standards Board should have the authority over the standards. Bergeson had fought hard to include this in the Hughes-Hart reform bill and wanted it in this bill as well. The Commons Commission felt that control had to be placed with teachers and wanted to move away from the top-down approach. The Commons Commission felt that if more responsibility and accountability were placed with teachers, the profession would attract a better quality of candidates and produce more positive results.

Fifth, there were debates about the proposed residency requirement. The CTC wanted the Standards Board to have authority over beginning teacher assessment, arguing that without uniform criteria for clear credentials, the requirements would be uneven throughout the state. Hart felt that a “framework” might be established but that a highly prescriptive checklist would be unacceptable.

Sixth, one of the most contentious issues in the bill was the proposal that the credentialing agency discontinue program review and, instead, the Standards Board would choose a national or regional body to accredit training programs, such as the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE). The CTC did not think that the Standards Board should be tied down to an accrediting body indefinitely, since California’s new evaluation design and standards would be stronger than NCATE’s and NCATE did not include standards on how well beginning teachers should perform.

Finally, there were debates regarding the role of internships as alternative routes into teaching. The CTC inquired about eliminating the Teacher Trainee Program, which was used

almost exclusively in Los Angeles and at that time. However, some legislators wanted to strengthen the program by integrating practice and theory, by making it more like an internship, and by involving higher education. The CTC mentioned that the Commission was currently evaluating the program and they could live with its continuation at least until the results are known—the program was subsequently given a positive evaluation. Bergeson was examining the issue of replacing emergency credentials with an internship program leading preliminary credential. The said that the Commission wanted the internship program to be viewed as an alternative that would include student teaching and support. To The Commons Commission the internship was intended for “mature” people with “intensive” summer course work prior to and following the school year that would combine the fifth year and residency into one year. The internship envisioned would be designed for seasoned and mature people who were ready to undertake supervised classroom work without substantial assistance. The CTC agreed that people ready for the rigors of teaching should not be held back; however, they that some individuals who had just completed their bachelor’s degree and could not financially afford a fifth year of study would also want to take advantage of the program. These individuals would need as much support as an ordinary beginning teacher would. Bergeson felt that the opportunity to begin teaching early and earn a salary immediately should be one the primary incentives for an internship program. She also wanted interns in residency to carry a full teaching load—she and other members of the Republican caucus were finding it difficult to accept the residence with an eighty- percent workload and full salary.

As proposed amendments emerged, it became apparent that the differences between the CTC and legislators could be the undoing of both bills. In the memo to his colleagues, Commission staff David Wright wrote:

Direct communication with Bergeson should be pursued, . . . but we should keep Senate staff informed of what we are telling both Senators. Some explanations will be most persuasive to Bergeson; others will appeal to Hart. Without working the two sides against each other, it may be possible for us to salvage much of what we have sought in SB 1605.

Although the CTC's primary goal was to retain the "existence, composition, functions, staffing and funding" of the agency, it decided to work with Bergeson to seek amendments to the Standards Board provision in her bill. The Commission wanted the Board's composition expanded to fifteen: six teachers, two administrators, three faculty members, two board members, four public members and the five existing *ex-officio* members. It sought authority for the Board to establish standards for accreditation and to establish "sound alternative patterns" to gain a credential, and to mandate fewer restrictions on teacher education programs, and for funding for beginning teacher assessments and a teacher information system.

When Bergeson's bill came before the Senate Education Committee in April 1986, the bill analysis noted that the bill contained five of the twenty-seven Commons Commission recommendations and four major shifts in credentialing policy. Program approval would be discarded; a bachelor's degree would be required prior to entering teacher training; a one-year residency would be required for a permanent credential; and a second autonomous unit would enforce discipline standards. The bill passed on a 6 to 0 vote and went on to Senate Appropriations.

The first resistance the bill met was fiscal. The Department of Finance opposed the bill primarily for fiscal reasons and, secondarily, for policy concerns. Its analysis revealed a \$127 million per year cost for residency, which did not contain a "continuing revenue source." Further, it questioned whether it was essential to abolish the CTC to accomplish the reforms. It wondered how a second autonomous board would lead to an "efficient review" of "allegations of credentialed staff misconduct. . . . It appears that the potential exists for an inconsistent application of policy standards with two separate groups.

In an effort to seek accommodation, Bergeson addressed the Commission and appealed to the body to concentrate on areas other than the Board's membership. Regardless, several Commissioners stressed the importance of having a broad representation and making the disciplinary function the Board's responsibility rather than a function of a separate board. By the end of the meeting, Bergeson admitted that she was still considering changes in the membership categories, but in private, she intended to hold out as long as possible. Before going before the Senate Appropriations, she inserted amendments to reduce the cost of



residency, to delay the start of the beginning teacher support program, and to eliminate the "clinical" professors' support and assessment functions.

Nevertheless, both Bergeson's and Hart's bills became "bottled up" in Senate Appropriations over CTA's objections to the peer review provisions in Hart's bill. CTA was not willing to accept peer review, even for interns. In a move that essentially rescued Bergeson's bill, Hart removed peer review provisions from his bill and persuaded his Democratic colleagues to keep Bergeson's bill alive on the merit of the issues. Similar to most Sacramento lobbying organizations, the CTA exaggerated when reporting the events to its membership.

In one of the most dramatic turnarounds in the history of California politics, lawmakers last month stripped Senate Bill 1604 of all the provisions CTA had objected to . . . revamping the evaluation system by giving authority to teachers' unions and superintendents to throw some teachers—including those with tenure—into a "peer review" system. Aside from creating still another layer of bureaucracy, assigning some teacher to evaluate others would have undermined both collegiality and faculty morale. . . .

"When legislators and the media talk about CTA as 'the powerhouse in education,' it's victories like SB 1604 that they have in mind," observed a jubilant CTA President Marilyn Russell Bittle.

During the Assembly Education Committee hearings in July 1986, the Commission was unwilling to go beyond its "neutral" position because college faculty members "would not be represented adequately on the Board." Apparently, the Education Committee was not impressed with the Commission's position and passed the bill on a 9 to 2 vote. During the hearings, it became apparent that there was uncertainty regarding accreditation and program review. The Commission felt that it had been treated unfairly by the accusations that its review process was ineffective. With the uncertainty surrounding the issue, the Commission sought an opportunity to defend the process and sought compromises that would allow the agency to continue program reviews. In a letter to Bergeson two days after the hearing, Mastain proposed that the agency retain program review. He claimed that the process was being redesigned and would eventually be "the best system of teacher education program

review in the nation." Getting to the heart of the issue, Mastain stated: "The Commission believes strongly that the Standards Board must have the authority to accredit programs on the basis of standards of quality and the judgments of qualified professionals."

Regardless of Mastain's letter, amendments were adopted to replace program approval with accreditation. One amendment retained the Teacher Trainee Program while another required subject matter examinations before issuance of the permanent credential rather than prior to issuance of the preliminary. This was designed to allow out-of-state teachers to begin teaching immediately without having to pass a subject matter examination. In August, despite the large number of Commission amendments that had been accepted, the CTC still maintained its "neutral" position. It wanted two additional seats for higher education and an *ex officio* seat for the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC).

At the bill's hearing before the Assembly Education Committee, Bergeson adopted further amendments to require that subject matter examinations be appropriate for the grade level to be taught, teacher assessment teams be trained and sensitive to language and cultures of major ethnic groups and possess strategies for teaching English to limited English speakers, and the faculty member on the Standards Board be a "member of the CSU faculty . . . selected from a list of at least three candidates supplied by the CSU Academic Senate." The bill passed and went to the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. Where Mastain again pressed for more faculty members on the Standards Board. Bergeson amended the bill to respond to the Commission's requests.

With little time remaining before legislative adjournment in August, Bergeson's bill began to encounter major obstacles. The Ways and Means bill analysis that teaching had not improved after several years of experimentation and the expenditure of and spending millions of dollars. Some legislators expressed concern about the effect proposed examinations would have on minorities. In the Assembly Education Committee, an amendment had been added to "double join" Bergeson's bill with one carried by Hughes to raise beginning teachers' salaries in those districts that had not taken advantage of the 1983 Hughes-Hart major reform bill. "Double joining" stipulated that unless Hughes' bill was enacted into law, Bergeson's bill could not take effect. Hughes' bill was blocked in Senate Finance, and her purpose probably was to force Bergeson to lobby on Hughes' behalf. Although Bergeson was not a

member of the committee and had little influence with its members, she did talk to some members; nonetheless, Hughes' bill was voted down.

When her bill came to the Assembly floor, Bergeson proposed a floor amendment to delete the "double joining" language, but Hughes opposed the amendment and the Democrats voted it down. Hughes opposition may have stemmed from alarmist letters to Assembly Education Committee members from CSU Chancellor Reynolds. Reynolds had convinced Hughes and Maxine Waters that the bill's testing requirements were adverse to minorities, and the minority caucus, in turn, had convinced the Democratic Caucus to oppose the bill. However, CSU's motive may not have been straightforward. There was widespread belief that the true reason for CSU's opposition was that examination results, if published, would embarrass individual campuses.

### **Bergeson's 1987 Bill**

In January 1987 Bergeson introduced her reform bill again. Although similar to the previous one, in a surprise move, she removed the provision to replace the Commission with the Standards Board. Bergeson had settled on a fifteen-member composition with an educator majority and had decided not to re-negotiate the issue. The CTA continued to push for a teacher majority, stating: "it is our firm conviction that giving teachers more responsibility for and authority over their profession would be the first major step needed to raise instructional standards in California." In March, after adding an amendment to increase the number of teachers, the Senate Education Committee unanimously approved Bergeson's bill and passed it on to Senate Appropriations.

During this period, Honig and Commons had joined forces and introduced another bill based upon the Common's Commission's recommendations, an action that later put Honig in direct conflict with Deukemejian. In addition, the Commission was able to successfully sponsor legislation on teacher misassignment.

During the Fall of 1987, the CTC's relationship with the Governor's offices was strengthened. Petrossian and Mastain had dinner with the Governor education adviser, Peter Mehas, and discussed the future of the credentialing agency. He expressed a desire to help pass the Bergeson bill and, in November, arranged for Petrossian to meet with Governor Deukemejian. The primary purpose of the meeting was to talk about the Commission's

unfilled seats, but the agency's future came under discussion. The Governor expressed support for the autonomous agency, and as an aside, Petrossian convinced the Governor that beginning teacher support was necessary. An alliance was forged. Two days later, Petrossian met with Assembly Minority Leader Pat Nolan and Assemblyman Chuck Quackenbush. They discussed the Commission's accomplishments, the proposal to change its composition to an educator majority and her meeting with the Governor.

In December, Petrossian was re-elected to her fourth term as Commission Chair.

### **Bergeson's 1988 Bill**

Early in 1988, Petrossian and Bergeson again met with Mehas. They urged him to find funds for the first-year cost of beginning teacher support and to testify on behalf of Bergeson bill before the Senate Appropriations Committee. Governor Deukmejian's State-of-the-State speech reflected optimism. After announcing that it was his "mission to keep California on top in the world of growth and competition," the Governor stated he was proposing a \$1 billion increase in school funding. He also announced his desire to appropriate funds for "better training and testing of new teachers." When the budget was released the following day, \$1.1 million was allocated for the Commission and \$1.9 million for the State Department to study alternative support and assessment models. Soon after, the Governor adopted a "support" position on the Bergeson bill.

Petrossian and Mastain had fostered an important relationship with Mehas and Deukmajian. As a result, Petrossian was asked to represent the Governor and Mehas at the National Governors' Conference devoted to the creation on a National Teaching Standards Board. On her return, Petrossian wrote that she considered the national standards board a "very valuable concept" deserving consideration. Petrossian noted that California already had implemented many of the recommendations promoted by the National Standards Board. In Petrossian's view, the value of the National Standards Board was illustrated in the differences between minimum state level "licensing" standards and national "certification" standards for high levels of competence. She could not see how any state could object to the National Standards Board, "but as those who work with the board have stated, this is definitely a "stars and moon concept." There were many issues that had to be overcome. Among these, the most prominent were establishing standards, equity issues, funding and the meaning of national

certificates to local districts. It was estimated that at least five years would be required to resolve the major issues.

In January 1988, with omnibus bills stopped by the Gann limit, Bergeson's credentialing reform bill had the inside track. The bill passed out of Senate Appropriations on a 10 to 0 vote and, three days later, passed the Senate on a 38 to 0 vote. Governor Deukmejian thanked the Commission for its support on "our budget proposal, particularly our commitment to fund more teacher training and staff development. I am pleased with our plans for the upcoming year, which also include the highest level of pupil support for K-12 school in California history."

Because of the Governor's support, interest groups began to take a serious interest in Bergeson's bill. Higher education stakeholders questioned training models that excluded college or university course work. CFT President Miles Myers, himself a college instructor, wrote that the Commission appeared to be abandoning the university approach to teacher education and threatened to use collective bargaining tactics to gain control over standards used by districts engaging in teacher training. CCET wrote Mastain complaining that the Commission staff had proposed some teacher education models that excluded higher education.

Even with the Governor's support, the financial requirements of beginning teacher support became an obstacle. Because of the Department of Finance's objections, the Governor's office asked Bergeson to remove funding for the support and assessment system. It was the intent of the Department of Finance to wait until the result of pilot studies were known before supporting legislation to implement the support and assessment program. However, Bergeson believed beginning support and assessment to be the heart of the reform and, if removed, would reduce the bill to little more than a plan to complete pilot studies. Although Bergeson may have verbally acceded to the request, it is clear from subsequent events that the Senator did everything possible to resist the removal of the provision.

To begin with, the Commission's and Bergeson's staffs met with major organizations to gain support and outline strategies. Mastain, Wright, Gary Jerome, Bergeson's staff representative, and others met with the Governor's and Finance's staffs to determine ways to make the bill more acceptable. A subsequent meeting was held with the major organizations,

and with the exception CSU, representatives agreed that they wanted a more comprehensive bill. CSU expressed concerns about the possibility that a teacher-training model could exclude higher education.

In spite of Finance's opposition, Bergeson and the Commission pushed further and drafted amendments to give the Commission exclusive authority to adopt and implement the support and assessment system without additional legislation. In a meeting, Jerome told Mehas that Bergeson was committed to a genuine reform and could not settle for anything less than the full implementation of the residency program. A few days later, Mehas told Petrossian that the Governor's support for the bill had not changed.

Throughout the legislative saga, the Commission attempted to retain program review. Hart called program approval a "disaster area," and expressed the view that although the process may have improved considerably, he believed the concept "flawed." He believed that the State should not be regulating reviews, that program assessment should be accomplished through assessments of subject matter knowledge, basic skills, and teacher performance. Hart believed that peer accreditation was essential if teacher education was to be raised in stature. He spoke positively of Chancellor Reynolds' comparison of teacher education to the medical profession.

Meanwhile, the University of California considered program review to be an infringement on its autonomy. CSU was less concerned and simply wanted the term "program accreditation" changed to "state program approval" with the stipulation that there be increased cooperation between the state program approval process and the national accrediting agency.

Prior to Bergeson bill's hearing before the Assembly Education Committee in May, Assemblyman Bader told Bergeson that he wanted all the program approval and accreditation provisions removed from the bill. He was only interested in the "outcomes" and believed that individual candidates' assessment was sufficient. Bader claimed that both program review and accreditation were a "shuck," an exercise in "mutual back scratching," and did not reflect the quality of the programs or of their graduates.

The Commons Commission had recommended that program approval be discontinued and accreditation be instituted by a non-governmental organization. Under this notion, the CTC could select and set standards, and based on these standards, the non-governmental

organization would carry out the review and accrediting functions. Theoretically, a California accrediting body, similar to NCATE, could be created and be comprised of school and higher education professionals. With wider participation, it was suggested that there would be a greater sense of ownership and responsibility.

When Bergeson's bill was heard before the Assembly Education Committee, ACSA took an opposing position because of the loss of one of its two seats, and the State Board took an "oppose unless amended" stand because the bill eliminated its authority over the Commission's regulations and statutes. Several amendments were accepted, the most notable being one that embodied the Commons Commission proposal for accreditation. Bader took an opposing position because the bill allowed the Commission to continue program review indefinitely if "no entity had submitted a satisfactory proposal for program accreditation." Since Bader was Vice-Chairman of the committee and carried influence with the Republican Caucus, this could be a problem. Even if the bill got to the Governor's desk Deukmejian would have difficulty in signing it if the Republican Caucus recommended a veto. This caused the bill to be held up in the committee.

It was the University of California's long standing position that a state agency governing teacher education had nothing to do with its research mandate. The state constitution placed the university outside the legislature and governor's authority and it exercised considerable autonomy. Because of this stance, some university departments chose not to provide their teacher candidates with an approved course work option, thus requiring teacher candidates from their departments to pass examinations. When it looked like Bergeson's bill might pass, UC proposed a number of amendments to limit the scope of accreditation standards, limit the participation of school people on accreditation councils, and sunset the Commission's authority to conduct program review.

In protracted negotiations, Senator Bergeson offered accommodation by proposing alternatives. For example, instead of having to pass an examination for the second stage credential, candidates for the preliminary credential either would have to pass an assessment or complete an accredited program. In the end, the university was unable to persuade the Legislature to remove overseeing the state from accreditation reviews. Under the Bergeson proposal, however, UC could contract with an organization such as NCATE to conduct accreditation reviews according to State standards. Moreover, UC gained provisions that

would give teacher preparing institutions considerable input into fashioning the standards. By limiting accreditation to teacher preparation, UC freed undergraduate programs from being assessed or reviewed by the State. UC students desiring a credential, would have to pass a subject matter examination prior to being issued a preliminary credential. The UC system felt that examinations should not be a problem for their graduates.

On the other hand, the CSU system tended to design their subject matter programs for teachers and was more willing to undergo a State approval process. Candidates graduating from State approved CSU subject matter programs would be able to earn a preliminary credential without examinations; however, they would have to pass a subject matter examination for a permanent credential. CSU wanted a campus-based assessment as an alternative to examinations so that individual campuses would not be compared. CSU believed that a campus-based assessment would help students who had difficulty with examinations, such as minorities.

The Los Angeles and San Diego school districts, as well as ACSA, disliked provisions raising requirements for emergency "permits." The bill proposed that teachers have a bachelors degree, twelve units in the subject to be taught for a single subject credential, forty units in subjects commonly taught in elementary schools for a multiple subjects credential, and pass an examination. Their primary objection was the examination. They claimed that not enough candidates could pass the examinations to fulfill their needs. As a result of these concerns, the bill was amended so that individuals could meet permit requirements through course work. If "permit" teachers were needed, school boards would be required to declare a shortage, obtain written agreements from the local unions, and document that they had searched for qualified teachers.

At its June 1988 meeting, the Commission reacted strongly against the amendments to limit accreditation and ease emergency permit requirements and, abruptly, changed its position from "Support" to "Disapprove Unless Amended," thereby threatening to drop its own bill. Some compromise amendments were placed in the bill, and Petrossian persuaded the more militant commissioners to soften their position.

One of the problems related to emergency permits. Conceivably, a teacher could renew the permit an infinite number of times without having to undergo the tests and assessments.



After a meeting with the interested stakeholders, amendments were proposed to allow the Commission to "establish standards for the issuance and renewal of emergency permits" so that the number of times an emergency permit was issued could be controlled.

On the issue of UC, Peter Mehas "concurred" with the Commission's position but felt that university system's concerns had to be addressed. He also informed Petrossian that even though the governor's office had recommended to Assembly Education Committee members that they vote for the bill, because of Bader's objections, the bill had been held up for months. Petrossian and the Commission's staff then lobbied the committee members, emphasizing Mehas' recommendation.

The Commission, wanting both program review and teacher assessment, produced a document entitled *Candidate Assessment and Program Quality Accreditation in Teacher Certification: Why Both?* It argued that standardized testing omitted many aspects of competence and evaluated only some skills required by teachers. Moreover, it claimed that program approval provides the assurance of quality and that training programs improve as a result of periodic evaluations. Ultimately, it argued, the State has the responsibility to ensure the knowledge and skills required to pass a teaching assessment are included in programs.

Finally in late June 1988, the Assembly Education Committee passed Bergeson's bill on a 12-2 vote. With the exception of ACSA and the State Board, most major organizations spoke in favor of the bill. In addition, the State Board this time argued that the reconstituted Commission would consist of a majority of "credential holders," and the regulations should continue to be approved by a "lay" board. ACSA expressed concern about whether a teacher's first year should be a part of the probationary period.

Assembly Members Bader and Bill Leonard voted against the bill. Bader wanted total deregulation of the teacher preparation programs and candidate assessment as the only screen for teachers. Leonard did not see the need for teacher licensing, felt that it should be abolished and wanted teacher training programs to become optional. According to his view, a bachelor's degree should be the only statutory requirement for teaching. School districts should be allowed to hire anyone they chose and provide them with on-the-job training. This would broaden the pool from which teachers were to be drawn. More individuals could try teaching. If they were competent, they could have tenure. If they are incompetent, they

could be dismissed. From Leonard's view, credentialing unduly discouraged people who would otherwise might contemplate teaching.

During July 1988, the Department of Finance again notified the governor's office that it opposed to the bill because the state should not be committed to a teacher residency before results of the pilot studies were known. To overcome the objection, the Commission staff met with the governor's staff on three occasions with Petrossian and Bergeson attending one meeting. These meetings centered around four issues—Finance's opposition, Bader's desire to terminate program review, the State Board's desire to have authority over regulations, and the Commission's composition. In the end, the governor's staff said that they would ask the Governor to make decisions about the first three issues; however, they did not think the Commission's composition worthy of his attention. Commission and Bergeson staff members continued to meet with Mehas to devise strategies to overcome Finance's opposition.

When Governor Deukmejian was presented with the three alternatives, he was unwilling to go against Finance's recommendation; however, he was willing support a non-binding phrase to implement residency following the pilot studies. He had no opinion about program review, but he expressed hope that Bergeson and Bader could reach an agreement. Finally, the Governor felt that the Commission's regulations should not be subject to approval by the State Board. Because of Deukmajian's position, the commitment to residency was removed from the bill.

When the bill was heard by the Assembly Ways and Means in August, both the Legislative Analyst and the Department of Finance were asked for its fiscal impact. The Legislative Analyst stated that the range between \$5 and \$ 31 million while Finance estimated that the cost could be up to \$72 million. Because of a crowded agenda, Bergeson was allowed only a brief hearing and the bill was put over until late August.

Bader still could persuade the Republican Caucus to vote against the bill on the Assembly floor and send a negative message to Deukmejian. However, eliminating the residency system placed the bill in a different perspective for him. Without the residency system, the candidate-centered assessment system would not be implemented and without the assessment system, program review was the only mechanism for accountability. Residency would

require subsequent legislation—another battle, perhaps several years away with a different set of circumstances. Because of this, Bader backed away from his opposition.

In late August, Bergeson's bill passed out of Ways and Means on a 22 to 1 vote and passed the full Assembly with a vote of 65 to 1. Governor Deukmejian signed the bill into law on September 26 to become effective 1 January 1989.

### **Summary**

The scope of credential reform of the eighties was severely curtailed when the support and assessment provisions of Bergeson's bill were deleted. Nevertheless, during this period, several important reform measures were enacted, some of which had lingered in the policy arena for years.

1. Bergeson's two-step teaching credential with support for beginning teachers and a thorough assessment before issuing a permanent credential were again notions that evolved from need and reaction. With schools losing up to fifty percent of beginning teachers within five years from entering the classroom, something was lacking. However, there were really three major factors affecting attrition—remuneration, working conditions, and the lack of a mentor and support while learning the craft. While the first two factors are expensive and difficult, beginning teacher support is something that almost everyone can agree upon. To come to such a conclusion, policy makers finally had to bury the notion that virtually anyone can teach. There is some satisfaction in that thought. Nevertheless, support and assessment, probably the most substantive reform proposals of this century, failed to be implemented.

2. The Bergeson Act did increase the role of teachers on the Commission on Teacher Credentialing. Although it is not a teacher majority as the unions or the Commons Commission desired, it is a certificated—school people—majority. This is very different from the public majority—seven public members and two school board members—of the former Commission. Having a teacher majority has been a long-standing issue with advocates who feel that teachers must be in control if teaching is

to become a true profession. This notion stems from the professional standards movement in the 1950s that started advocating that teaching should pattern itself after the full professions such as medicine, law, architecture, etc. In California, the CTA proposed a commission during the legislative formation of the Fisher Act and was instrumental in its inclusion in the Ryan Act. Now, certificated employees have the majority, making the body more "professional," at least symbolically.

3. Enactment of the CBEST requirement restricted entry into the occupation for individuals who cannot demonstrate competence in basic skills. California State University also tightened its entry requirements into teacher training programs, limiting entry to individuals from the top half of their class and interviewing prospective candidates to assess their suitability for teaching.
4. Enacting requirements for continuing education.
5. Placing limitations on teacher misassignment.
6. Enacting program accreditation.
7. Enacting emergency permits.
8. Enacting study residency.

This chapter has examined much the political dynamics and human frailties that have accompanied reforms in the 1980s. Drives towards greater professionalization, higher status, and more centralization were all present. Like the previous reform periods since World War II, this one also had the specific purpose to "reduce and streamline the credentialing system." The system will only remain simpler if policy makers retain one system over a long period as teachers with the older credentials retire, and if they resist pressures for increased specializations, each with their own training requirements.

With each subsequent credential reform period in California, the driving forces have become increasingly diffused. The leading political figures during 1980s were Senators Hart and Bergeson who carried most of the Commission's and the Commons Commission legislative proposals. They were also influential in having several credential reforms included in the Hughes-Hart Reform Act. The Commission was influential in the reforms, especially after

its performance improved under the leadership of Petrossian and Mastain. The turnaround of the Commission is a story in itself. Much credit can be given to Chair Petrossian and Executive Secretary Mastain.

Absent from the credentialing arena was the State Board of Education, which had been at the center twenty short years ago. Its arguments for a more cohesive educational policy failed to overcome the forces that want direct participation in the credentialing process. Further, the destructive power of Deukmejian's and Honig's disagreements kept the State Board on the sidelines. Putting credentialing back in or near the State Department would have given Honig more influence and perhaps made him look more effective to the public. Moreover, Sacramento has a history of taking functions away from State Superintendents it dislikes. The Republicans did not want to give him credentialing.

The trend toward achieving greater professional status has continued. In a society that increasingly equates materialism with status, this continues to be an elusive quality for teachers. Nevertheless, requirements for both academic and professional preparation courses have become more specific as well as substantive.

## NOTES

### Reform in the 1980s

1. There was speculation that the CTA opposed Hart because he had authored the legislation requiring CBEST. Moreover, it resented his carrying the Commission's reform bill requiring teachers take education courses at the beginning of their careers when they could least afford them in terms of time and money.
2. Fallon's article mentioned another dimension to CTA's opposition. "The commission has a heavy representation of federation (California Federation of Teachers) members, and this appears to be one factor in the CTA's determined opposition to the bill." More accurately, three Commission members had CFT affiliation—teacher representatives Salley and Nancy Flanigan and faculty representative Levering, and all three were involved in the Commission's leadership. At the time, they were the driving forces behind the Commission's reform agenda. Their appointments had been the result of the CTA's poor relations with Governor Jerry Brown. The CTA had not supported Brown when he ran for governor initially and had opposed him when he ran for a second term. In contrast, CFT was affiliated with labor, had strong ties to the Democratic Party, and consequently, had the advantage when appointments were made to the Commission.
3. Assembly Democrats were arguing for a tax increase, and Assembly Speaker Willie Brown proposed a tax increase on cigarettes, liquor, and people with high incomes. Republicans were resisting and said that the proposal didn't "face up to the fiscal realities of California or to the election of Republican Gov. Deukmejian, who opposes tax increases." Speaker Brown hoped for "a negotiated settlement with the governor" (*Bee*, 22 April 1983).
4. This was an agenda item of Los Angeles Unified School District which suffered from a chronic shortage of teachers.

5. To be considered a profession, the Education Round Table advocated expanding the role of teachers using a career ladder. "Teaching must be structured and perceived as a progression from initial limited tasks to substantial responsibility for the classroom, the school, and the profession." Under this proposal, teachers would be evaluated by peers and progress through a career ladder (interns, apprentices, career teachers, and master teachers). Titles such as "teacher" and "credentials" would be reserved for accomplished professionals. Emergency credentials would be called "emergency permits."

6. For Sacramento players, membership on the Commission was an important issue. During the formation of Bergeson's bill, it was the consuming issue. Everyone wanted a piece of the action. This was the reason for their presence in the city—to influence policy and events. In those terms, having a seat on the Commission becomes important. From that perspective, some organizations won and lost in the formation of the new commission. Teachers and the State Superintendent gained, the administrators and the *ex officio* members representing the branches of higher education remained static, and everyone else lost. School boards lost one member, the public lost three members, and higher education was reduced from three to one voting member. On the original 1971 Ryan Commission, higher education had four voting members although that was adjusted to two members in 1978 and three in 1979.

This shift in membership probably represents a shift in power and influence. The California Teachers Association has become much more active in Sacramento affairs in recent years. After adjusting to becoming a union and to collective bargaining in the 1970s, the organization has increasingly concentrated on affecting policy issues in the 1980s. The organization is just as intense in other areas of government activity affecting public schools. During the 1970s and early 1980s, higher education came to be viewed as having "captured" the Commission, especially during Peter LoPresti's tenure as Executive Secretary.

Higher education's influence has not only come through its voting seats and its four *ex officio* members. There are a relatively large number of teacher education organizations and institutions that send representatives to the Commission's meetings. Some are very knowledgeable, articulate, and have been attending meetings for years. Some of these representatives keep track of the regulations in the minutest detail and they protected their institutions' interest by actively participating in the formation of regulations. This was not

only through formal participation in Commission and sub-committee meetings but also through informal discussions with Commission members and its staff.

The public was originally given membership on the Commission to protect the public interest—a concept that is not well defined. In 1971 the Commission began with three public members, and that number was expanded to seven in 1978 as part of a movement to expand public representation on all commissions. Under the Bergeson Act, that number was reduced back to four. Certainly some of public members must have felt at a disadvantage with respect to representatives from higher education and the other experts surrounding the body. It may take some considerable time to understand the occupation and the issues. Undoubtedly, there have been public members who have worked with diligence and gained the knowledge necessary to overcome the obstacles of expertise and confidence.

7. Late in the fall 1986, Honig and Commons had invited a number of organizations and agencies, including the Commission, to discuss the reform legislation. CTC staff members were told that all issues were open for discussion and that compromises would only be made at the time when each organization was willing to negotiate the whole package. The primary purpose of these omnibus measures was not to modify credentialing but rather to reduce class sizes; tie funding more closely to the cost of materials and services; raise the minimum salaries for new teachers; introduce and restore several categorical programs; fund reform programs; increase summer school allocations; double the number of mentor teachers; and extend the School Improvement Program. Nonetheless, it contained provisions to place credentialing under Honig's direction. This 1987 legislation was contained in two identical bills carried by Assembly Member Vasconcellos and Senator Presley. An optimistic State Department press release stated:

Assembly Member Teresa Hughes (Los Angeles), chair of the Assembly Education Committee and co-author of the earlier reform bill SB 813 in 1983, was present to lend support to the measure, as was Dorman Commons, . . . Representatives of the state's major education organizations also joined the group including California Teachers Association (CTA), California School Boards Association (CSBA), Association of California School Administrators



(ACSA), California Federation of Teachers (CFT) and Parent Teacher Association (PTA).

(California State Department of Education 1987)

Because the omnibus bill required a \$884 million increase in the education budget, Governor Deukmejian reacted quickly. He chastised the proponents for "perpetrating a hoax on the public" by calling for the new programs without specifying how they would be funded. Praising his own financial support for schools, the Governor noted that "the taxpayers deserve fewer complaints from our top school officials and more results." The statewide organizations' backing for the omnibus bills may not have been as strong as Honig's portrayal. Although they were present at the bill's introduction, the CTA and CFT had not yet taken positions on the bills, and ACSA and CSBA were not supporting the bills because of the funding provisions.

Soon, the omnibus bills were in trouble caused by Honig's and Deukmejian's feud over finances. As a Los Angeles *Times* article stated:

Deukmejian said he was rebuffed when he asked Honig to back off from their heated differences over education funding in a long, private meeting between the two leaders in the governor's office last month.

"I asked Honig if he would be cooperative rather than carrying out the war that he started and he refused to do so. . . .

"He and his Democratic allies in the Legislature want even more money. They always seem to want more money." . . .

[Honig] denied that he is engaged in "a war" with Deukmejian. "It's not a war, it's a debate over policy, . . . His offer of a truce was, 'You stop telling people that we are not giving the schools enough money.' He wanted us to sit back and take what he gave us. That's not a truce, that's an ultimatum," Honig said.

The press persistently mentioned Honig as a potential Democratic nominee to run against Deukmejian in 1990. This undoubtedly added tension between the two.

The feud was mirrored in the legislature by single focused requests for amendments to satisfy particular constituencies. Before the Assembly Education Committee, Mastain testified in opposition to the bill; he believed that the bill's governance structure would not work, that the Standards Board could not be held accountable because of the heavy reliance on the State Superintendent and the national accreditation body. At this juncture, Vasconcellos disappointment with the Commission for several years, claimed that an appointed Commission could never be held as accountable as an elected Superintendent, nor could it be as effective as an elected Superintendent in bringing public attention to the problems of the education profession.

Before the Senate Education Committee, Honig claimed a bill was needed to keep the reform's momentum going and to invest in future effectiveness. Not far in the presentation, Senator Rebecca Morgan noted the extent to which the bills overlapped with Bergeson's bill, which had already passed the committee. Honig responded that he and Bergeson had met and agreed to work together. Presley stated that he and Bergeson also would seek to reconcile their differences. Bergeson agreed, but noted that her bill was held up in the Appropriations Committee, which Presley chaired. Presley stated that when the state's fiscal condition became clear, a decision regarding her bill would be made. In the meantime even his bill probably would be held up. The bills passed and went to the Appropriations Committee to await action.

Late in May 1987, the CTA gained a number of amendments in both omnibus bills, but with Deukmejian holding the line on educational funding, the likelihood of the omnibus bills' passage had diminished greatly. Deukmejian had also cut the State Department's budget by ten percent, and there was little chance under this scenario that credentialing would be placed under Honig's direction. While many of the omnibus bills' provisions appealed to legislators and their constituents, the credentialing issue by itself had little public appeal and few constituents. As one Commission staff member stated, Honig's credentialing provisions were an "albatross around the bills' necks."

Presley and Vasconcellos did not want to fight a credentialing battle while pushing for the bill's more popular provisions. As a result, the Commission successfully lobbied Presley to strip Honig's credentialing reforms and replace them with Bergeson's, and the bill passed out of Senate Appropriations. But because Bergeson did not support Presley's omnibus bill, her

bill remained behind. She accepted the defeat and felt that the bill would succeed the following year. Petrossian met with the Governor's education advisor, Peter Mehas, who stated that Bergeson's legislation would be openly supported by the administration the following year.

When Presley's bill passed the Senate and went on to the Assembly, Vasconcellos, feeling that his bill was no longer needed, stopped his bill except for the provisions relating to credentialing and staff development. It passed out of Assembly a few days later on a party line vote. Nevertheless, by December, the chances for action on Presley's bill were slim. Money could only be made available if Californians voted to raise the Gann limit—a very unlikely proposition. In the end, financial constraints stopped the omnibus bills along with their credential reforms.

8. A 1987 Commission report, entitled *Teacher Assignment Practices in California School Districts*, revealed that eight percent of California teachers were misassigned to one or more classes daily and that five percent were teaching wholly outside their legal authorizations. To overcome the problem, the Commission persuaded Senator Diane Watson to carry legislation that would empower the Commission to impose sanctions against administrators who assign teachers outside their credential authorizations. When the Senate Education Committee held its first hearing on the bill in May, some members expressed concern that specific requirements were being added to the Education Code, stating that if Bergeson's or one of the omnibus bills passed, the Commission could deal with the misassignment issue through regulations. Only the CFT spoke in favor of the bill, and Watson asked that the bill be held over for reconsideration. The following month, the bill was "double joined" to Presley's omnibus bill. If his bill passed, the statutes enacted by Watson's bill would be nullified and the "new" Commission with broader powers could enact the misassignment provisions. The bill had easy passage through the Senate and Assembly.

Before going to the Governor, the final details of the bill needed to be worked out in a conference committee. At this point, the CTA wanted an amendment designating the local collective bargaining unit to be responsible for selecting members to the committees overseeing local assignments. Because the conference committee meeting did not appear on the public file for the necessary three days, it was necessary to get a waiver from an Assembly requiring a two-thirds vote. Because of the CTA amendment, the bill became

labeled a "teacher union" bill, and the Republican caucus refused to release its members to vote for the waiver. Watson was faced with a difficult decision. She could put the bill over until January or strip out the amendment. Feeling that she had an agreement with the CTA, she decided to delay the bill. However, the Governor's office indicated that it would support the bill without the amendment. Ultimately, the teachers' unions agreed, the amendment was removed, and the bill went on to be passed and signed by the Governor. With comparative ease, another major goal of the Commission had been accomplished.

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